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David Card and Laura Giuliano




We study social interactions in the risky behavior of best-friend pairs in the National Longitudinal
Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).  Focusing on friends who had not yet initiated a particular
behavior (sex, smoking, marijuana use, truancy) by the first wave of the survey, we estimate bivariate
discrete choice models for their subsequent decisions that include peer effects and unobserved heterogeneity.
Social interactions can lead to multiple equilibria in friends’ choices: we consider simple equilibrium
selection models as well as partial likelihood models that remain agnostic about the choice of equilibrium.
Our identification strategy assumes that there is at least one individual characteristic (e.g., physical
development) that does not directly affect a friend’s propensity to engage in a risky activity.  Our estimates
suggest that patterns of initiation of risky behavior by adolescent friends exhibit significant interaction
effects.  The likelihood that one friend initiates intercourse within a year of the baseline interview
increases by 4 percentage points (on a base of 14%) if the other also initiates intercourse, holding constant
family and individual factors.  Similar effects are also present for smoking, marijuana use, and truancy.
We find larger peer effects for females and for pairs that are more likely to remain best friends after
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  Parents worry that their children will imitate the bad behavior of their peers.  This is especially 
true during adolescence when parental authority is waning and children are first exposed to risky 
behaviors.  Peer imitation can lead to “bad” equilibria where everyone in a peer group engages in a 
behavior they would not choose in the absence of social pressure (Brock and Durlauf, 2001).  
Nevertheless, the actual magnitude of the peer effects in adolescent preferences is unclear.  Social 
interaction effects are hard to distinguish from correlated background factors that influence individual 
choices (Manski, 1993; Moffitt, 2001).  Recent studies have tried to sidestep this problem by focusing on 
interactions within randomly assigned or quasi-experimentally manipulated peer groups.
1  Unfortunately, 
the peer effects observed in such groups may not provide a full picture of the social interactions in 
naturally occurring friendships.  Indeed, recent work by Carrell, Sacerdote, and West (2011) suggests that 
a change in the random assignment process can lead to sharply different patterns of social interactions, 
depending on the nature of the friendship networks that are formed after the group is assigned. 
  In this paper we attempt to directly measure the peer effects between best-friend pairs in the 
National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add Health).  Specifically, we focus on interactions in 
the decisions to initiate (or increase the intensity of participation in) sexual activity, cigarette smoking, 
marijuana use, and truancy.  Rather than rely on random or quasi-random variation in the characteristics 
of one friend or the other we model the choices of the pair, allowing for interaction effects and correlated 
unobservable determinants of their joint behavior.
 2  Econometrically the distinction between social 
interactions and correlated background factors is very similar to the distinction between state dependence 
and heterogeneity in dynamic discrete choice models (e.g., Heckman, 1978, 1981; Hyslop, 1999).  Our 
identification strategy relies on the existence of at least one characteristic of each friend that affects their 
                                                 
1 For example, studies have analyzed quasi-experimental variation in neighborhoods (e.g. Oreopoulos, 2003; Jacob, 
2004; Kling, Liebman, and Katz, 2007), classmates (e.g. Argys and Rees, 2008; De Giorgi, Pelizzari and Redaelli, 
2010 ); college roommates (e.g. Sacerdote, 2001; Zimmerman, 2003; Kremer and Lavy, 2008; Stinebrickner and 
Stinebrickner, 2006); and squadrons in the U.S. Air Force Academy (e.g. Carrell, Fullerton and West, 2009).  
Though the results of these studies vary, several find very little evidence of peer effects, including Oreopoulos 
(2003),  Sacerdote (2001), and Zimmerman (2003). 
2 A similar approach is taken by Huang (2010) who studies participation by family members in cell-phone network 
service contracts.  Krauth (2006, 2007) considers situations where only the choices of one member of a peer group 
and the average choice of the remaining members are observed, and makes an assumption about the correlation 
between the unobserved determinants of friends’ choices.   3
own choice but does not directly affect their friend.  An added complication in the analysis of social 
interactions is the possibility of multiple equilibria.  Borrowing from the literature on market entry games, 
we estimate partial likelihood methods that remain agnostic about equilibrium selection (Bresnahan and 
Reiss, 1990, 1991; Tamer, 2003; Ciliberto and Tamer, 2009), as well as models that impose simple 
equilibrium selection rules (Bjorn and Vuong, 1984; Bajari, Hong and Ryan, 2009). 
  Four key features of the Add Health data set are central to our analysis.  First, the study collected 
detailed information on networks of friends that can be used to identify dyadic relationships between 
sample members.
3 Second, the Add Health sample frame included a set of “saturated” high schools from 
which all students were included in the study.  This greatly increases the number of friend pairs that can 
be followed over time.  Third, the baseline and follow-up surveys include detailed questions on risky 
behaviors that provide the outcomes for our analysis.  Finally, Add Health also collected a rich set of 
individual characteristics—including grades, measures of physical development, and risk attitudes—that 
plausibly have no direct effect on the behavioral choices of a friend, conditional on an existing friendship.  
  We develop and estimate a series of models for the joint choices of friends that allow both social 
interaction effects and unobserved heterogeneity across pairs.  Our simplest specifications are bivariate 
probit models for the decision to engage in a risky behavior (e.g., sexual intercourse), conditional on 
neither member of the pair having engaged in that behavior at the baseline.  We also consider ordered 
choice models that differentiate between levels of activity (e.g., intimate touching versus intercourse).  
We use a series of Monte Carlo simulations to evaluate the power of our models to distinguish social 
interaction effects from unobserved heterogeneity, given the available sample sizes and the explanatory 
power of the observed covariates.  Models based on a dichotomous choice have relatively low power in 
our setting, but ordered choice specifications that impose an equilibrium selection assumption are 
sufficiently powerful to permit meaningful inference.  
                                                 
3 See Smith and Christakis (2008) for a review of the literature on social networks and health, much of which has 
relied on Add Health.  Other studies that have used the social network data in Add Health include Haynie (2001), 
Fryer and Torelli (2006), Bramoulle, Djebbari and Fortin (2007), and Halliday and Kwak (2009).   4
  Our empirical findings suggest that the patterns of initiation of risky behavior by pairs of 
adolescent friends exhibit significant but modestly-sized social interaction effects.  For example, in our 
ordered models of sexual activity, the likelihood that one friend initiates intercourse in the year following 
the baseline interview is increased by about 4 percentage points (on a base rate of 14 percent) if the other 
also initiates intercourse, holding constant family and individual factors.  The estimated effects appear to 
be relatively robust to the “exclusion assumptions” used to identify the social interactions.  The 
magnitude of these estimated effects implies that situations with multiple equilibria are relatively rare 
(typically less than a one-percent incidence rate for any of the behaviors).  We also find that the strength 
of the peer effects varies with characteristics of the friends, and that there are potentially important 
asymmetries in the interactions between friends, depending on the degree of reciprocity in their 
relationship.
 4 
  The next section lays out our modeling framework and provides links to the related literatures.  
Section III discusses the Add Health data set and the construction of our analysis samples.  We then turn 
to estimation issues in Section IV, beginning with a set of simulations and then developing a series of 
models for sexual behavior.  We summarize the results for the other risky behaviors in Section V, and 
present some concluding remarks in Section VI. 
 
II. Modeling the Interactions of Friends 
a. Single Discrete Action 
  Many observers have argued that adolescents tend to emulate the behavior of their friends and 
peers (see e.g., Berndt, 1982 and Akerlof, 1997).  To formalize this idea as simply as possible, consider a 
pair of friends, 1 and 2, each of whom can either initiate a behavior or not.
5  Letting u(y1,y2) represent the 
payoff to #1 when she chooses action y1∈{0,1} and her friend chooses action y2∈{0,1} and v(y1,y2) 
                                                 
4 Others have emphasized gender differences in the magnitude of peer effects based on college roommates 
(Stinebrickner and Stinebrickner, 2006), classmates (Argys and Rees, 2008), and neighborhoods (Kling, et al. 2007). 
5 Soetevent and Kooreman (2006) analyze equilibria among groups of friends of size n, and show that the number of 
equilibria in the presence of social interaction effects grows exponentially in n.  In light of this problem we focus on 
the simplest possible case of n=2.   5
represent the associated payoffs to #2, their joint decision problem can be represented by a standard 
matrix: 
                                                                          Friend #2’s Choice           
               0                                           1 
                                                     
       0          u(0,0), v(0,0)        u(0,1), v(0,1)    
Friend #1’s 
Choice 
      1          u(1,0), v(1,0)        u(1,1), v(1,1) 
 
Depending on the payoffs, this simple game can have 0, 1, or 2 Nash equilibria in pure strategies.  
 Suppose  that  the  relative payoffs for choosing to initiate the behavior can be parameterized as: 
(1) u(1,  y2) −  u(0, y2) =   X1β  − c(y2)  +  ε1 , 
(2) v(y1, 1) −  v(y1, 0) =   X2β  − c(y1)  +  ε2 , 
where X1 and X2 represent observable characteristics of the two friends,  β is a parameter vector, ε1 and ε2 
represent characteristics of the two friends that are known to them but not to an outside observer, and c(y) 
represents the social interaction effect of one friend’s choice on the other’s valuation of the activity.  We 
assume that ε1 and ε2 are distributed across the population with some joint distribution F(ε1, ε2; θ) > 0, and 
let ρ=ρ(θ) represent their correlation coefficient. Note that the specification of (1) and (2) imposes 
symmetric peer effects: by assumption, the relative payoff to each friend includes the same function c(y) 
of the other’s choice.   In Section IV (below) we allow for asymmetric effects in a more general ordered 
choice setting. 
  Equations (1) and (2) are equivalent to a bivariate latent choice model of the form: 
(3a) 
*
1 y    =   X1β   +   ε1  ,                y1  =  1[
*
1 y  > c(y2) ] 
(3b) 
*
2 y    =   X2β   +   ε2  ,            y2  =  1[
*
2 y  > c(y1) ] . 
Given that y1and y2 are dichotomous, a general model for c(y) is 
 c(y)   =   c0  −  γ y , 
where γ is positive if friends prefer to imitate each other.  Assuming γ ≥ 0, equation (3a) implies: 
   y1  =  1  if  ε1  >  c0 − X1β  ,     regardless of the value of y2      6
   y1  =  0  if  ε1  ≤  c0 − X1β − γ  ,     regardless of the value of y2    
   y1  = 0 or 1  if   c0 − X1β − γ  <  ε1  ≤ c0 − X1β  , depending on the value of y2.  
A parallel set of conditions govern y2, leading to the partition of (ε1, ε2) space illustrated in Figure 1.  
When γ > 0 there is a region 
(4)  A  =  { c0 − X1β − γ  <  ε1  ≤  c0 − X1β ,  c0 − X2β − γ  <  ε2  ≤  c0 − X2β } , 
in which there are two possible equilibria: either  y1  = y2  = 0 or y1  = y2  = 1.   
  We consider three possible methods for estimating models like (3a)/(3b) for the initiation of a 
risky behavior by a pair of friends.  The first, introduced by Bresnahan and Reiss (1990, 1991), is a 
partial likelihood approach.  Notice from Figure 1 that the probabilities that the two friends make 
different choices can be expressed as: 
(5a)  p(0,1) = p( (y1, y2) = (0,1) ) =  p(ε1  ≤  c0 − X1β − γ ,  ε2  >  c0 − X2β ) 
(5b)    p(1,0) = p( (y1, y2) = (1,0) ) =  p(ε1  >  c0 − X1β , ε2  ≤  c0 − X2β − γ) 
The remaining probability mass can be then assigned to the combined event that (y1, y2) ∈ {(0,0), (1,1)}:  
(5c)   p( (y1, y2) ∈ { (0,0) , (1,1) } ) = 1 − p(0,1) − p(1,0). 
Assuming that (ε1, ε2) are independent of (X1, X2), and that there is at least one covariate with infinite 
support that appears exclusively in either X1 or X2, the coefficients β and γ and the parameters of F(· , ·; θ) 
are identified, and can be estimated consistently by maximizing this partial likelihood (Tamer, 2003).  As 
discussed below, we rely on this “exclusion-based” identification strategy throughout this paper.  In our 
main analysis we assume that X1 and X2 are distinct (so none of #1’s X’s directly affect #2, and vice versa) 
though in Section IVf below we relax this assumption in several directions.  
  Tamer (2003) also notes that the efficiency of a partial likelihood approach can be enhanced by 
making use of auxiliary sample information on the likelihood of one of the two non-uniquely specified 
outcomes.  Specifically, define  
 H(X1, X2) = p( (y1, y2) = (1,1)  |  X1, X2) ,    7
and letH ˆ represent a (non-parametric) estimate of H.  Tamer proposes to maximize the quasi-likelihood 
consisting of probability statements (5a), (5b), and 
(6a)  p(1,1) =  H ˆ  
(6b)  p(0,0) = 1 − p(0,1) − p(1,0) − H ˆ . 
Tamer (2003) shows that under standard assumptions, maximization of this quasi-likelihood will yield 
estimates that are at least as efficient as those from a simple partial likelihood. 
  Our third approach is to augment the system (3a) and (3b) with a simple equilibrium selection 
model, yielding a “full likelihood” for the observed data.  As a baseline we follow Bjorn and Vuong 
(1984) and assume that when there are multiple equilibria, one-half the time (0,0) is observed and one-
half of the time (1,1) is observed.  Under this assumption the likelihood of the observed data combines 
equations (5a) and (5b) with: 
(7a)  p(1,1) = p(ε1  >  c0 − X1β − γ , ε2  >  c0 − X2β − γ)  −  ½ p(A) 
(7b)  p(0,0) = p(ε1  ≤  c0 − X1β , ε2  ≤  c0 − X2β )  −  ½ p(A) , 
where p(A) ≡ p( (ε1, ε2 )∈A) and A is defined in (4).  We also consider the limiting cases where p(A) is 
assigned to either p(1,1) or p(0,0).  A more flexible approach is to posit a parametric model for the 
equilibrium selection probability that depends on the characteristics of the friends, as suggested by Bajari, 
Hong and Ryan (2009). 
 
b. Ordered Intensity of Action 
  The preceding framework can be easily extended to model the intensity of participation in a risky 
behavior.  In our analysis below, for example, we consider two levels of sexual activity: intimate contact 
without intercourse, and intercourse.  Indexing the choices in order of intensity by {0,1,2}, assume that 
the relative payoffs for #1 are given by: 
(8a) u(1,  y2)  −  u(0, y2)  =   X1β   +   ε1  −  c1(y2) 
(8b)   u(2, y2)  −  u(0, y2)  =   2( X1β  +  ε1 )  −  c1(y2)  −  c2(y2) ,   8
where c1(y2) and c2(y2) incorporate the social interaction effects of #2’s choices on #1’s preferences (with 
c1(y) < c2(y) for all y).  Assuming similar payoffs for #2 (with the same c1(y) and c2(y) functions), the 
choices of the friends can be represented by a bivariate ordered choice system in which the cutoffs for the 
choices depend on the choices of the other friend:  
(9a) 
*
1 y    =   X1β   +   ε1 ,   
   y1 =  0  if 
*
1 y  ≤ c1(y2);   y1 =  1  if c1(y2) < 
*
1 y  ≤ c2(y2);    y1 =  2  if 
*
1 y > c2(y2),  
(9b) 
*
2 y   =    X2β  +   ε2  ,         
   y2 =  0  if 
*
2 y  ≤ c1(y1) ;   y2 =  1  if c1(y1) < 
*
2 y  ≤ c2(y1) ;    y2 =  2  if 
*
2 y  > c2(y1) . 
  As a baseline we assume that the functions c1(y) and c2(y) satisfy: 
(10a) c1(y)  =  c10  −  γ1 (y≥1) , 
(10b) c2(y)  =  c20  −  γ2 (y=2) ,  
where c20 > c10 , γ1 ≥ 0, γ2 ≥ 0, and  c20  − γ2 >  c10.  Equation (10a) implies that the threshold for the 
intermediate level of activity falls when the other friend engages in the intermediate level of activity, but 
is not further affected if the friend chooses the high level of activity.  Equation (10b) implies that the 
threshold for choosing the higher level of activity is only affected by whether or not the other friend 
engages in the high level.  We consider more general models for c1(y) and c2(y) in Section IV, below, and 
show that the restrictions implied by (10a) and (10b) appear to be consistent with the data. 
Figure 2 illustrates the partition of (ε1, ε2) space associated with each of the 9 possible outcomes 
for (y1, y2).  As shown in the figure there are two regions with multiple equilibria: region A where (0,0) 
and (1,1) are both possible; and region B where (1,1) and (2,2) are possible.  Note that if the highest level 
of activity is treated as the main outcome of interest, and the two lower levels are pooled, then Figure 2 
collapses to a (re-parameterized) variant of Figure 1.  Nesting of the dichotomous model inside the 
ordered model arises from the assumption in (10b) that the threshold for the highest level of activity is 
only affected if the friend engages in the highest level of activity. Alternatively, if the two higher levels of 
activity are pooled, Figure 2 also collapses to a variant of Figure 1.  Again, this arises from the   9
assumption in (10a) that the threshold for choosing between the lowest and intermediate level of activity 
only depends on whether the friend is engaging in the lowest level of activity.
6 
The model represented by equations (9) and (10) can be estimated using a partial likelihood 
approach, a quasi-likelihood approach, or a full likelihood with a model of equilibrium selection.  The 
partial likelihood approach uses the fact that there is a one-to-one mapping between seven distinct regions 
of (ε1, ε2) and seven outcome sets for (y1,y2).  Six regions map to the unique outcomes (0,1), (0,2), (1,2), 
(1,0), (2,0), and (2,1), while the remaining region maps to the outcome set {(0,0),  (1,1), (2,2)}.  Given a 
distribution function for (ε1, ε2) and values for the parameters (β, γ1, γ2) the probabilities of these outcome 
sets can be readily evaluated. 
  The quasi-likelihood approach follows Tamer (2003) by introducing auxiliary functions: 
(11a) H11(X1 ,X2) = p( (y1, y2) = (1,1)  |  X1, X2),      
(11b) H22(X1 ,X2) = p( (y1, y2) = (2,2)  |  X1, X2),  
that represent the conditional probabilities for 2 of the 3 non-unique outcomes.  The quasi-likelihood 
function uses estimates of the ij H ˆ  functions as values of the likelihoods for the associated outcomes, 
assigns the probabilities for the unique outcomes directly,  and fills in the remaining probability for the 
(0,0) outcome as: 
(11c)  p(0,0) = p(  (y1, y2) ∈ {(0,0),  (1,1), (2,2)}  ) −  11 ˆ H  −  22 ˆ H . 
As in the simpler case exposited by Tamer (2003) it may be necessary to “trim” the values of 
the ij H ˆ functions to ensure that this probability is strictly positive.  Finally, the full likelihood approach 
specifies a probability for each of the possible equilibria in the region of non-uniqueness, leading to 
simple expressions for the likelihood of the observed data analogous to equations (7a) and (7b). 
   
 
                                                 
6 One justification for the restrictions in (10a) and (10b) is that these are necessary and sufficient to ensure that the 
ordered model can be collapsed to a dichotomous model by pooling either the two lowest activity levels or the two 
highest activity levels.   10
III. Data and Sample Construction 
a. The Add Health Data Set 
  We use data from Waves 1 and 2 of the National Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health (Add 
Health).  This study collected longitudinal information for a sample of U.S. adolescents who were in 7
th-
12
th grades in the 1994-95 school year (see Harris et al., 2009).  It includes information on demographic 
and physical characteristics, personality traits, academic performance, family and household 
characteristics, and a wide range of behaviors.  A unique feature of the data set is the ability to link 
respondents who identify each other as friends. 
  In Wave 1, the study selected a stratified random sample of 80 high schools, plus the largest 
middle school that fed into each high school.  An in-school questionnaire was administered to all those 
who were present on the day of the survey (n>90,000).  A subsample of enrollees was then selected to be 
interviewed at home: a total of 20,745 in-home interviews were completed in Wave 1.
7  One year later a 
second wave of in-home interviews was administered to the same group, yielding a panel of 14,736 
students with data from the Wave 1 and Wave 2 in-home surveys.
8  Importantly, the Add Health sample 
design included 16 schools in which all students were eligible for in-home interviews.  Given that most 
friendships occur among students who attend the same school, these “saturated” sample schools provide 
many of the best friend pairs who are included in both waves of in-home interviews. 
 
b. Construction of Friend Pairs 
  From the subset of adolescents who completed both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 in-home interviews 
we constructed a sample of same-sex friend pairs, using friendship information from the Wave 1 in-home 
interview and the in-school questionnaire.
9  In the in-home interview, all students were asked to name a 
best female friend and a best male friend.  Those in saturated schools were asked to list up to five female 
                                                 
7 Students were eligible for in-home interviews even if they did not complete the in-school questionnaire.  A 
separate in-home interview was completed by their parents. 
8 The main loss of sample between Wave 1 and Wave 2 arose from the graduation of 12
th –grade students. Graduates 
were not re-interviewed unless they had younger siblings in the school.  
9 We include non-responders to the in-school questionnaire, who represent about 20% of our sample.   11
friends and five male friends, with their best friend of each gender listed first.  The in-school 
questionnaire also asked all students to list up to five friends of each gender.  
  To construct a sample of best friend pairs, we first matched respondents who nominated each 
other as best friends in the Wave 1 in-home interview.  Next we matched all remaining respondents to 
their best friend nominees from the in-home interview, whenever those nominations were reciprocated by 
the nominees on the in-school questionnaire.
10  Then we matched all remaining respondents who 
nominated each other as best friends on the in-school questionnaire.  These three steps resulted in 667 
“reciprocated” best friend pairs.  In a fourth and final step, all unmatched respondents were matched to 
their in-home or in-school best friend nominee, if the nominee was in the sample and still unmatched, 
with priority given to in-home nominees. This process yielded an additional 1,201 “non-reciprocated” 
friend pairs.
11  In all, we have 1,868 friend pairs from which we draw our outcome-specific estimation 
samples.  The relatively small number of friend pairs reflects our requirement that both members of the 
pair have to be included in the initial Add Health in-home interview sample, and in the Wave 2 follow-up. 
 
c. Behavioral Outcomes and Associated Estimation Samples 
  We examine four types of risky behavior: sexual activity, cigarette smoking, marijuana use, and 
truancy.
12  For each behavior, we define both an intermediate and a high level of intensity.  The dependent 
variables in our analysis are either binary indicators for engaging in a behavior with a particular level of 
intensity, or ordered variables with three values ranging from 0 (neither level of intensity) to 2 (the 
highest level of intensity).   
                                                 
10 We give primacy to the in-home interview both because our other baseline variables are measured at the time of 
this interview, and because 20% of respondents did not complete the in-school questionnaire.   
11 Data for the subset of sample members who provided multiple friendship nominations (i.e. those who completed 
the in-school questionnaire and/or were in a saturated school) suggest that just over half of those who received but 
did not reciprocate a best friend nomination listed the nominator as one of their five best friends.   
12 Initially we also examined alcohol use, but found little evidence of correlation in the initiation of alcohol use 
among friends.  Hence we do not model the initiation of alcohol use, though we use Wave 1 information on alcohol 
as a control variable in some of our specifications.   12
  In each case, the dependent variable measures behavior as of the Wave 2 interview. However, the 
estimation sample is restricted to pairs where neither member had engaged in the behavior as of the Wave 
1 interview.  This sample restriction allows us to focus on the initiation of each behavior, and to rule out 
selection of friends on the basis of pre-existing behavior as a source of correlation in the Wave 2 
outcomes.  Our four measures of risky behavior are: 
 Sexual  activity:  In both Waves 1 and 2 sample members were asked if they had ever had sexual 
intercourse.  They were also asked to list all romantic and sexual relationships within the past 18 months, 
and check off a list of sexual activities that had occurred in each relationship.
13  We assign an 
intermediate level of sexual activity to those who were in at least one relationship as of Wave 2 that 
involved “touching each others’ genitals”, but not having intercourse.  We assign the high level of activity 
to those who had intercourse.
14  Wave 1 responses are used to construct two estimation samples:  the 
subset of 738 friend pairs who reported neither level of sexual activity in Wave 1; and the sample of 929 
friend pairs who had not had intercourse as of Wave 1.   
 Cigarette  smoking: Respondents were asked about their history of cigarette smoking in Wave 1.  
In Wave 2 they were asked how often they had smoked cigarettes since the Wave 1 interview.  We define 
intermediate-level smokers those who had tried cigarettes as of Wave 2 but who were not regular 
smokers, and high-intensity smokers as those who smoked regularly—that is, at least one cigarette every 
day for 30 days.
 15  For the smoking analysis, we construct a single estimation sample consisting of 738 
friend pairs who had never smoked an entire cigarette as of Wave 1. 
 Marijuana  use: Questions about marijuana use in the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviews are similar 
to those about cigarette smoking.  We define intermediate marijuana use as having tried marijuana as of 
                                                 
13 The in-home interviews were done using a laptop computer with confidential audio-CASI sections for the more 
sensitive questions about illegal and other risky behavior. 
14 To avoid confusing peer effects with sexual activity between same-sex best friends, we restrict attention to 
activity with a partner of the opposite sex.   
15 This is the definition of regular cigarette smoking employed in the Add Health interviews.  Respondents were also 
asked on how many of the past 30 days they had smoked.  Among those who had tried smoking as of Wave 2, the 
distribution of days smoked is bimodal, with modes at zero at 30 (accounting for 26% of the sample each).  Of those 
who had tried cigarettes but had not smoked regularly (i.e. the low-intensity smokers), 80% smoked on less than five 
days and the majority smoked one day or less.    13
Wave 2, and high level use as having used marijuana one or more times in past 30 days.
16  Our analysis 
sample for use of marijuana is comprised of 1,076 friend pairs who had have never tried marijuana as of 
Wave 1.  
 Truancy: In each wave of in-home interview, respondents were asked how many times during the 
current or most recent school year they had skipped skip school for a full day without an excuse.  We 
define intermediate-level truancy as having skipped school only once during the Wave 2 school year 
(1995-96), and high-level truancy as having skipped more than once.
17  The estimation sample is 
comprised of 964 friend pairs who had not skipped school at all during the Wave 1 school year (1994-95). 
d. Individual and Household Characteristics 
  In our empirical analysis we control for respondents’ age, race, and gender, as well as many other 
individual and family characteristics.  The main covariates are as follows: 
•  GPA is the average of the respondent’s self-reported grades in English and Math for the most recent 
grading period as of Wave 1.
18 
•  Physical development index is constructed using Wave 1 responses to 3 gender-specific questions on 
physical development.  These are converted to z-scores and averaged. 
•  Attitude toward risk is based on agreement with the statement “You like to take risks.”
19  This is 
reported on a scale from 1 (strongly disagree) to 5 (strongly agree). 
•  Future orientation is based on agreement with the statement: “You live your life without much 
thought for the future.” This is reported on a scale from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree). 
                                                 
16 Among the “high-intensity” marijuana users in Wave 2, the distribution of times used in the past 30 days has a 
median of 3, a mean of 10, and a standard deviation of 20. 
17 Among “high-intensity” truants, the distribution of days skipped has a median of 4, a mean of 7, and a standard 
deviation of 9.9. 
18 In cases of non-response on the in-home interview, self-reported grades from the in-school questionnaire were 
used instead.  In a few cases where a respondent took English but not Math, the Math grade was imputed. 
19 This question and the “future orientation” question were asked only in Wave 2.    14
•  Time preference is based on self-assessed likelihood that the respondent will be killed by age 21 
and/or will contact HIV/AIDS.  The likelihoods of each outcome are reported on a scale from 1 
(almost no chance) to 5 (almost certain): we average the two responses. 
•  Smokers in household is a dummy indicating that either the parent interview indicated there were 
smokers in the household, or the Wave 1 interviewer reported evidence of smoking in the household. 
•  Two-parent household is a dummy for the presence of two parents as of Wave 1. 
•  Frequency parents attend church is based on the Wave 1 parent interview, with four values from 0 
(never) to 3 (once a week or more).  Missing values are set to 0 and we include a dummy for these 
cases.  We also assign a separate indicator for Parents not religious if the parent reported either 
having no religion or never going to church. 
•  Parental education measures are based on Wave 1 reports of parental education.  We classify families 
with 2 indicators: (a) at least one parent has completed high school (b) at least one parent has 
completed college.  Missing values are set to 0 and we include a dummy for missing data. 
 
e. Sample Statistics 
  Table 1 presents summary statistics for the variables in our analysis.  Column 1 shows data for all 
adolescents who completed both the Wave 1 and Wave 2 interviews, while column 2 is limited to those 
who are in a best friend pair, and columns 3 and 4 show characteristics for the two sub-samples we use in 
our analysis of the initiation of sex activities.  Looking first in the upper panel of Table 1, the individual 
and family background characteristics of respondents who can be combined into best-friend pairs (column 
2) are not too different from the overall Add Health sample (column 1), though the matched friends 
include more girls than boys, tend to have a slightly higher grades, and are more likely to come from 
religious and two-parent families.  Students in the subsamples with limited sexual experience (columns 3 
and 4) are younger, more likely to be female, and have higher grades and slightly better-educated parents.   15
   The middle panel of Table 1 shows the rates of participation in various risky behaviors as of 
Wave 1.  About 40% of Add Health respondents report intimate touching, and 35% report intercourse.  
These rates are a little lower for the respondents who can be matched to friend pairs, and (by definition) 
are 0 or close to 0 for the subsamples with limited sexual experience as of Wave 1.  Incidence rates for the 
other risky behaviors are also in the 20-40% range, but are lower for the subsamples with limited sexual 
experience.   
  Finally, the bottom panel of the table reports levels of sexual experience as of Wave 2.  Over the 
one-year interval between the waves the overall fractions of respondents who report having had intimate 
contact or intercourse increase by 10 percentage points.  Among those with very limited sexual 
experience as of Wave 1 (column 3) these rates increase from zero to 22% for intimate contact and from 
zero to 14% for intercourse.  Among those with some experience but not intercourse (column 4), both 
rates increase by 18 percentage points.   
  Appendix Table 1 shows data for subsamples with low levels of each of the other risky behaviors 
as of Wave 1 (e.g., those who had never smoked a cigarette).  These show similar patterns to those in 
columns 3 and 4 of Table 1, though rates of initiation of the other activities are somewhat lower than the 
rate of initiation of sex.  Among friend pairs who had not smoked a cigarette as of Wave 1, the initiation 
rates are 19% for experimental cigarette smoking and 3% for regular smoking.  For marijuana use, the 
corresponding initiation rates are 10% for experimental use and 6% for regular use; and for truancy, they 
are 16% for skipping one day and 8% for skipping more than one day. 
  Adolescent best friends tend to be of similar age, race, and family background, and to have 
similar experiences in risky behaviors.  This is illustrated in Table 2 where we show the within-pair 
correlations of the main variables in our analysis.  Friendships are particularly homogeneous with respect 
to age and race: 90% of friends are within a year of age, and 86% of the time they are of the same race 
(defined as white, black or other).  The correlations are also relatively high for GPA, but relatively low   16
for the measures of attitudes toward risks, future orientation, and time preference.
20  Interestingly, the 
degree of correlation is not too different for pairs with low levels of sexual experience at Wave 1 than for 
the overall sample of friends (compare columns 2 and 3 to column 1). 
 
IV. Main Estimation Results  
a. Identification 
  Our empirical approach is to fit bivariate probits (equations 3a and 3b) and bivariate ordered 
probits (equations 8a and 8b) to data for best friend pairs on the initiation of various risky behaviors.  In 
our main models we assume that the behavior of each friend is only affected directly by his or her own 
X’s: in other words, we assume that X1 and X2 are distinct.  As a robustness check we also consider 
specifications where we rely on the exclusion of a single variable from each of X1 and X2 to achieve 
identification (i.e., we allow all but one of the X’s of each friend to affect both his/her own choices and 
those of the friend).  As shown by Tamer (2003), the existence of an excluded regressor with infinite 
support is sufficient to ensure identification of the parameters of interest for the models we are 
considering.  In practice, with the modest sample sizes and bounded covariates available in the Add 
Health, the performance of any of the three estimation methods (partial likelihood, quasi-likelihood, and 
full likelihood with a model of equilibrium selection) is less clear, particularly when the unobserved error 
components (ε1, ε2) are allowed to have an arbitrary correlation. 
  To provide some guidance on this issue we conducted a small scale Monte Carlo investigation.  
We simulated a series of data sets with 1,000 observations  (roughly the size of our Add Health samples), 
and a pair of normally distributed covariates, x1 and x2, drawn to have a correlation that (roughly) matches 
                                                 
20 This may reflect in part a relatively high level of noise in these measures.   17
the correlation of the covariate indexes X1β and X2β observed in our samples of best-friend pairs.
21  We 
then assumed one of three alternative data generating processes (DGP’s) for the onset of risky behavior:   
  DGP-1 – positive social interaction effects, ε1 and ε2 uncorrelated standard normals 
  DGP-2 – no social interaction effects, ε1 and ε2 correlated normals with ρ>0 
  DGP-3 – positive social interaction effects, ε1 and ε2 correlated normals with ρ>0.   
In cases of multiple equilibria (which arise in DGP’s 1 and 3) we assumed that one of the possible 
equilibria was selected with probability ½. We selected a coefficient b for the simulated covariates x1 and 
x2 and a constant (or pair of constants in the ordered response models), scaled so that the average rate of 
initiation of risky behavior (roughly) matches the rate observed in our samples, and the pseudo-R
2 in a 
probit or ordered probit for the initiation of risky behavior (roughly) matches the pseudo-R
2 coefficients 
observed in our sample.  For each of the three DGP’s we calibrated the magnitudes of the social 
interaction effects and the correlation coefficient ρ to (roughly) match the observed cross-tabulations of 
initiation rates for best friend pairs observed in the data.  
  Tables 3a and 3b summarize the results from estimating bivariate probit and bivariate ordered 
probit models using the simulated data.  For each DGP we estimated models with only social interaction 
effects (i.e., restricting ρ = 0), models with no social interactions but unrestricted heterogeneity (i.e., ρ 
free), and models that includes both social interaction effects and correlated errors in the two equations.  
The estimating models impose the (correct) equilibrium selection assumption of a 50-50 chance for either 
possible outcome in any region of multiplicity.  For each DGP and estimation method, we simulated 100 
data sets and estimated the specified model.  We show the median and mean estimation errors for the 
social interaction and error correlation parameters, along with the standard deviations of these errors. 
  Focusing first on Table 3a, the results suggest that even correctly specified bivariate probit 
models (with the correct equilibrium selection model) have limited power to distinguish social interaction 
                                                 
21 We fit probits and ordered probits for the initiation of each of the risky behaviors to the pooled data of both 
friends in each pair, using the set of individual and family characteristics described in the upper panel of Table 1.  
We then estimated the correlation of the fitted covariate indexes for each of the two best friends from these models: 
these ranged from 0.40 to 0.45.   18
effects from unobserved correlations between friends.  For example, when the data are generated by 
DGP-1 (γ>0, ρ=0) and a model is estimated that allows both social interaction effects and unobserved 
heterogeneity, the standard deviations of the errors for the estimates of γ and ρ are around 0.26 – so large 
as to preclude any useful inference.  When DGP-2 is correct (i.e., γ=0, ρ>0) the standard deviations of the 
estimation errors are a little smaller but there is a substantial upward bias in the estimate of γ (mean 
estimation error = 0.12), and a downward bias in the estimate of ρ (mean error = −0.12).  
  The results in Table 3b for the ordered response models are considerably more encouraging.  In 
particular, the standard deviations of the estimation errors from the general model in column 3 are much 
smaller than those in the corresponding column of Table 3a.  Moreover, the biases evident in the probit 
models are nearly eliminated in the ordered probit model.  Specifically, there is only a small downward 
bias in γ1 and γ2 (mean estimation error = .02) when the true DGP has no unobserved heterogeneity (ρ=0), 
and a similarly small downward bias in ρ when the true DGP has no social interaction effects.
22  When the 
true DGP has both correlated errors and social interaction effects, there is no evidence of any systematic 
bias in estimates derived from models that allow both effects (see rows 3a-c of column 3). 
  In the models we are considering the power to distinguish unobserved heterogeneity from social 
interaction effects depends critically on the explanatory power of the X’s in each of the two equations. We 
calibrated the DGP’s in Tables 3a and 3b relatively conservatively, setting the variances of the covariate 
indexes to yield pseudo R-squared coefficients that match those obtained with simple models for the 
initiation of sexual activities that include only the individual and family covariates summarized in the top 
panel of Table 1.  The explanatory power of models that also include indicators for experience in the 
other risky behaviors at Wave 1 is substantially higher (the pseudo R-squared coefficients roughly 
double).  If we adjust the DGP’s accordingly, the biases in the estimates of γ and ρ from the bivariate 
probit models are somewhat smaller (particularly the biases when the true model has no interaction 
effects but a general model is fit to the data) and the standard deviations of the estimation errors are also 
                                                 
22 It is also worth noting that if the true DGP has γ1=γ2= 0, the model that assumes ρ=0 results in upwardly biased 
estimates of γ1 and γ2 that are equal in size.  Thus a finding of γ1 ≠ γ2 would be inconsistent with γ1=γ2= 0, even if 
the model incorrectly assumes that ρ=0.   19
reduced.  These patterns suggest that it may be useful to compare the estimates of γ and ρ from the 
bivariate probit models as additional explanatory variables are added to the model, looking in particular 
for evidence that the estimates of ρ become less negative as set of controls is expanded. 
 
b. Bivariate Probit Models for Initiation of Sex 
  Table 4a presents a series of estimated bivariate probit models for the initiation of intercourse 
among best-friend pairs.  The sample includes 929 pairs in which neither friend had had intercourse as of 
Wave 1.  A parallel set of models for the subset of 738 friend-pairs with neither intimate sexual contact 
nor intercourse as of Wave 1 is shown in Table 4b.  To keep the tables readable we show only the 
estimates of ρ and γ, the maximized log likelihood, and two measures of the “fit” of the model: a simple 
chi-squared statistic based on the deviations between the predicted and actual number of pairs with each 
of the four possible outcomes (i.e., (y1,y2) = (0,0), (0,1), (1,0) or (1,1)) and a score test of the hypothesis 
γ=0 (applicable for the models that set γ=0).  We present four specifications: ρ=γ=0 (columns 1 and 5); 
γ=0 (columns 2 and 6); ρ=0 (columns 3 and 7); and both parameters free (columns 4 and 8).  The models 
in columns 1-4 include only individual and family characteristics, while the expanded models in columns 
5-8 also include eight dummy variables for baseline use/participation in tobacco smoking, marijuana, 
truancy, and alcohol.  Estimates of the coefficients of the covariates (i.e., the β’s) and their standard errors 
are presented in Appendix Tables 2a and 2b.  
  Looking first at the reference models in column 1 of Tables 4a and 4b which ignore any 
unobserved error correlation or social interaction effects, the goodness of fit and score test statistics 
suggest that these models are unable to explain the relatively high correlations between the behaviors of 
friends.
23  Allowing for either a correlation in the unobserved errors (column 2) or social interaction 
effects (column 3) leads to an improvement in the likelihood and a reduction in the goodness of fit 
statistics.  The maximized likelihoods are slightly bigger for models that allow a social interaction effect, 
                                                 
23 As a benchmark, the simple chi-squared statistic for the outcomes of the friend-pairs in Table 4a is 25.67. The 
much lower chi-square statistic in column 1 of Table 4a (12.69) shows that the observed covariates explain a 
reasonable share of the correlation between the friends’ outcomes.    20
but the differences are small.  In the larger sample of Table 4a, which includes friends who have 
intermediate levels of sexual experience at Wave 1, the estimates of ρ or γ are around 0.20: the 
corresponding estimates for the subsample of friends with relatively little experience at Wave 1, in Table 
4b, are around 0.28.  
  As suggested by the simulation results in column 3 of Table 3a, bivariate probit models that allow 
both correlated errors and social interactions are uninformative about the relative magnitudes of ρ and γ. 
The point estimates of ρ and γ are large in magnitude and opposite in sign, and their associated standard 
errors are large.
24  The large negative values for ρ, in particular, seem implausible—especially given that 
all of the observable covariates are positively correlated between friends.
25  Instead, we suspect that the 
negative estimates of ρ are due to the small sample biases identified in Table 3a.   
  The parameter estimates from the expanded specifications in columns 5-8, which include 
indicators for levels of experience in smoking, marijuana use, truancy, and drinking, suggest that some of 
the correlation between friend’s outcomes is attributed to the similarity of their Wave 1 experience in 
other risky behaviors.  Patterns of use of alcohol are particularly strongly related to the risk of initiating 
intercourse (see below), and are highly correlated between friends. Controlling for other risky behaviors 
at the baseline, the estimates of ρ or γ in models that allow either correlated heterogeneity or social 
interaction effects fall from 0.20 to about 0.14 in the larger sample (Table 4a) and from 0.28 to 0.22 in the 
smaller sample (Table 4b).   
  For the models that estimate both ρ and γ (columns 4 and 8), the addition of controls for other 
risky behaviors leads to more “sensible” point estimates (i.e., less negative estimates of ρ and smaller 
estimates of γ).  We interpret this pattern as consistent with the findings from our simulation study, which 
                                                 
24 An estimate of γ≈1 implies that a friend who would have a 0.2 probability of initiating intercourse in the absence 
of peer influence would have a 0.55 probability if his/her friend also initiated intercourse.  
25 Altonji, Elder and Taber (2005) have argued that the correlation of the unobserved determinants of some outcome 
is likely to be similar to the correlation of the observed determinants of the same outcome.  Krauth (2006) uses this 
idea to obtain estimates of peer effects in a setting where only mean behavior of an individual’s peer group is 
observed.  In our case, the correlation of the estimated indexes of observed determinants of intercourse for two best 
friends is about 0.4.  Imposing this estimate in our setting would lead to estimates of γ that are negative.   21
showed a similar pattern of reduced estimation biases in ρ and γ as the explanatory power of the 
covariates was increased. 
  While our primary focus is on the magnitude of social interaction effects between friends, the 
estimated effects of the individual and family background variables on initiation of sex are also 
interesting.  The estimates of β are very similar for the two estimation samples, and are quite robust to the 
treatment of correlated heterogeneity and social interaction effects.  (See Appendix Tables 2a and 2b.)  
Age and physical development have strong positive effects on the likelihood of initiating intercourse, as 
does black race.  In the baseline models students with a higher GPA are less likely to initiate sex, though 
this effect is smaller once controls are added for other risky behaviors at Wave 1.  Among the three 
qualitative questions designed to measure attitudes to risk, future orientation, and time preference, only 
the risk measure is significantly related to the likelihood of initiating intercourse.  Children from two-
parent families and those with better-educated parents are less likely to initiate sex between the waves of 
the survey, while the presence of a smoker in the household has a (surprisingly large) positive effect, even 
controlling for Wave 1 behaviors.  The expanded specifications in columns 5-8 suggest that the most 
important predictor of the likelihood of beginning intercourse is use of alcohol.  The probability of 
initiating sex is about 10-12 percentage points higher if the student reports having consumed alcohol 
without adult supervision at Wave 1.  Truancy behavior is also a significant predictor of the transition to 
sexual activity, whereas cigarette smoking and marijuana use are not. 
 
c. Bivariate Ordered Probit Models for Initiation of Sex 
  Given the limited power of the bivariate probit models, we turn to bivariate ordered probit 
models.  We begin with “full likelihood” models which assume equal probabilities of the 2 possible 
equilibria in any region of multiplicity. We then present partial likelihood models that relax the 
equilibrium selection assumption. 
  Table 5 presents estimation results for a series of eight models, similar to the ones in Tables 4a 
and 4b.  The models are estimated on the subset of pairs in which neither friend has engaged in intimate   22
touching or intercourse at Wave 1 (i.e., the same sample used in Table 4b). Beginning with the models in 
columns 1 and 5, which assume no correlation in the unobserved determinants of friends’ activities and 
no social interaction effects, the goodness of fit summary statistics in the bottom row of the table suggest 
that these models are unable to adequately fit the degree of correlation between friends in their ordered 
outcomes.
26  Allowing for either correlated heterogeneity (columns 2 and 6) or social interaction effects 
(columns 3 and 7) leads to a substantial improvement in fit, but the gains are larger from the models with 
social interaction effects.  Further improvements from the combined models which include both factors 
(columns 4 and 8) are relatively small.  As expected, the models with social interaction effects suggest 
that a higher level of activity by one of the friends provides a stronger “push” on the other friend.   
  In the models that allow both correlated heterogeneity and social interactions (columns 4 and 8) 
the estimated values for the correlation parameter are in both cases small and close to 0.  Moreover, 
unlike the case in Tables 4a and 4b, the estimates of ρ, γ1, and γ2 are hardly affected by the addition of 
controls for risky behaviors at Wave 1, despite the fact that these variables add substantial explanatory 
power.  We interpret this as evidence that the baseline X’s are powerful enough to reduce or eliminate any 
small sample bias in the estimated heterogeneity and interaction effects from a combined model.  Though 
the estimates from the combined model are relatively imprecise, the relatively small estimated values of 
ρ, and the relative stability of the estimates of γ1 and γ2 between models that set ρ=0 (columns 3 and 5) 
and models that treat ρ as a free parameter (columns 4 and 8) suggest to us that social interaction effects 
are the primary source of the correlation in the sexual initiation patterns of adolescent friends (conditional 
on their observed characteristics).   
  The estimates in columns 4 and 8 imply statistically significant interaction effects for sexual 
behavior, with a slightly larger effect on the highest level of activity (intercourse) than the intermediate 
level (intimate contact).  Specifically, the estimates imply that the likelihood of initiating intercourse 
increases by 4.5 percentage points (on a base rate of 14 percent) if one’s best friend also initiates 
                                                 
26 For comparison purposes, the simple chi-squared statistic for the outcomes of the pairs across the 9 possible cells 
is 28.60.    23
intercourse, and the likelihood of initiating intimate contact is increased by 4.1 percentage points (on a 
base rate of 22 percent) if one’s friend does the same.  The peer effect for initiating intercourse is 
comparable in size to the effects of living in a household with smokers, of living in a single-parent 
household, and of having parent(s) who did not complete high-school.  It is also comparable to the effect 
of a one standard deviation increase in one’s physical development index. 
 The  estimated  β coefficients for the models presented in Table 5 are shown in Appendix Table 3.  
These estimates are very similar to the corresponding estimates from the bivariate probit models in Table 
4b, as would be expected given that the bivariate probit model for the highest level of activity is nested 
within the bivariate ordered model.  As was true of the coefficient estimates from the bivariate probit 
models, the estimates from the ordered probit models are also very similar, regardless of the assumptions 
on ρ, γ1, and γ2.   
 
d. Models that Do Not Impose an Assumption on Equilibrium Selection 
   So far we have assumed that in cases where multiple equilibria are possible, one of the two 
equilibria is selected at random.  Table 6 presents a series of models that relax this assumption.  For 
simplicity we focus on models that assume no correlation in the unobserved determinants of each friend’s 
choices, and include only the baseline set of individual and family characteristics.   
  As a point of departure, the first column of the table reproduces the estimates from column 4 of 
Table 5.  The second and third columns present estimates where we assume that in cases of multiple 
equilibria the selected outcome represents either the higher or lower intensity choice for both friends. (For 
example, when (0,0) and (1,1) are both possible equilibria, the higher intensity choice is (1,1) and the 
lower intensity choice is (0,0)).  These “extreme” selection rules yield estimated peer effects, likelihoods, 
and goodness of fit statistics that are very similar to the “50-50 split” baseline.     24
  Columns 4 and 5 present estimates from a partial likelihood approach (which distinguishes 7 
outcome sets) and from Tamer’s quasi-likelihood approach.
27  In both cases, the likelihood (or quasi-
likelihood) is maximized at γ1=0.09 and on the boundary of the parameter space for γ2 (i.e., γ2=0), but the 
likelihood functions are extremely flat.  For comparison purposes we also estimated a partial likelihood 
model that sets γ1= γ2=0 but allows a free value for ρ, and one that allows all three parameters to be 
estimated.
28  The first model yields an estimate of ρ=0.08 (standard error=0.37), and a log likelihood 
value of −787.31 (just a little lower than the value for the model in column 5).  In the second, ρ=−0.40 
(standard error=0.38), γ1=0.53 (standard error=0.53) and γ2=0.03 (standard error=0.53).
29  We interpret 
these estimates as suggesting that the partial likelihood approach ignores too much information for us to 
learn much about the relative magnitudes of γ1 and γ2 versus ρ in our (relatively small) sample.  
Interestingly, however, the estimated β coefficients from the partial likelihood models are not very 
different from the estimates obtained from our “full likelihood” models.  Thus, it appears that a partial 
likelihood approach is useful for obtaining information about the effects of the exogenous variables. 
 
e. More Complex Models of Social Interactions 
  The models estimated in Tables 4-6 assume that one friend’s choice to engage in a particular level 
of activity only affects on the other’s threshold for the same level of activity.  Under that assumption, 
there are only two interaction effects, represented by γ1 and γ2.  In this section we consider a more general 
model that allows both thresholds to be affected by both of the friend’s choices, resulting in four possible 
interaction effects.  This model replaces equations (10a) and (10b) with the more general threshold 
equations: 
                                                 
27 We use flexible probit models to estimate the Hij functions defined in equations (11a) and (11b).  In the 
implementation of the method, it is necessary to impose bounds on the Hij functions to ensure that the probability 
defined in equation (11c) is strictly positive.  We use the function m(a,b) = -c log ( exp (-a/c)  + exp(-b/c) ) as a 
smoothed approximation of the min(a,b) function to impose these bounds while maintaining a differentiable 
likelihood. 
28 When γ1= γ2=0 there are no regions of multiple equilibria, so there is a 1:1 mapping from (ε1, ε2) to the observed 
outcomes (y1, y2).  However, it is still possible to define and estimate a partial likelihood defined over outcome sets. 
29 Again, similar estimates were obtained when the quasi-likelihood approach was used instead.   25
(12a) c1(y)  =  c10  −  γ11 (y=1) −  γ12 (y=2), 
(12b) c2(y)  =  c20  −  γ21 (y=1) −  γ22 (y=2).  
Our baseline model is a special case of this more general model with γ11= γ12 and γ21=0.   
  Figure 3 shows the partition of (ε1, ε2) space corresponding to the generalized model under the 
assumptions that 0 ≤ γj1 ≤ γj2 and c10 ≤ c20− γ22.  There are now four regions with multiple equilibria: two 
that are similar to the regions in Figure 2, a third region in which either (0,1) or (1,2) can occur, and a 
fourth where (1,0) or (2,1) can occur.  We estimate the model constraining the interaction coefficients to 
satisfy the ordering assumed in Figure 3, and assigning equal probabilities to the two possible equilibria 
in any region of multiplicity.  For simplicity, we also assume that the error terms are uncorrelated (ρ=0).   
  The results, summarized in Table 7, support the assumptions of our baseline model.  First, the 
similarity of the estimates of γ11 and γ12 implies that the threshold for intimate contact is lowered when 
the friend initiates this behavior, but is not further affected when the friend initiates intercourse.
30  
Second, the estimate of γ21 is much smaller than the estimate of γ22 and is close to zero in the model that 
controls for wave 1 behaviors (column 2).  This pattern suggests that the decision to initiate intercourse is 
only affected by the friend’s initiation of intercourse, and not by lower-intensity sexual practices. 
 
f. Relaxing the Identification Assumptions 
  As we emphasized in Section II, the ability to separately identify peer effects and unobserved 
heterogeneity relies on the existence of at least one (powerful) covariate that directly affects only one of 
the friends.  Our models so far have made the assumption that all the individual X’s for one friend are 
excluded from the other’s equation.  In this section we present two complementary checks of the 
robustness of our results to this assumption.  First, we sequentially allow each of the individual X’s to 
enter directly into the friend’s list of covariates, and check whether the estimated “cross-pair” effects 
(e.g., the effect of #1’s GPA on #2’s propensity to initiate sex) are statistically significant or large in 
                                                 
30 Our parameterization restricts the difference γ11- γ12 to be strictly positive, and the parameter estimate for this 
difference is near the boundary of the allowable space.   26
magnitude.  Second, we allow all but one of the individual X’s to directly influence the other friend, thus 
narrowing the source of identification to a single excluded covariate.  
  The results from the first check are summarized in Appendix Table 4, where we present a series 
of models based on the specification in column 8 of Table 5.  Only one of the covariates has a statistically 
significant “cross effect” on the friend’s behavior -- the dummy indicating that a respondent’s parents are 
non-religious.  This variable has a large negative effect on the friend’s likelihood of initiating sex 
(coefficient = −0.28, standard error=0.09), comparable to the own effect of this variable (coefficient = 
−0.23).  Interestingly, however, allowing for this cross effect has no impact on the point estimates (or 
standard errors) of ρ, γ1 or γ2. Two other covariates also have relatively large and marginally significant 
cross effects: the dummy for being a regular user of alcohol at Wave 1 (t=1.92) and the dummy for black 
race (t=1.87).  In both cases the cross effect has the same sign as the direct effect of the variable. In 
neither case, however, are the point estimates (or standard errors) of ρ, γ1 or γ2 much affected by the 
allowance for a cross effect.  Overall, inferences about the relative magnitudes of the social interaction 
effects are robust to allowing any of the individual X’s to have a direct cross effect. 
  Table 8 presents a more stringent test, where we allow all but one of an individual’s X’s to exert a 
direct effect on his or her friend’s behavior.  For reference, columns 1 and 2 reproduce the specifications 
from column 4 and 8 of Table 5.  (Recall that these estimates are based on the assumption that none of the 
X’s exerts a cross-effect.)  The remaining pairs of columns present specifications that allow all the 
covariates except the one listed in the column heading to affect the friend.  We focus on three potential 
variables that we think could be legitimately excluded from the friend’s equation: an individual’s physical 
development index, his/her GPA, and his/her risk preferences.  In all cases the estimate of γ2 remains 
relatively large and at least marginally significant. The estimate of γ1 is more variable across 
specifications, but is always within ½ of a standard error of the baseline estimates of 0.14 or 0.15.  The 
estimates of ρ from the alternative specifications is also a little higher than the estimates from the baseline   27
models, but never significantly so.  Overall, we interpret these results as confirming the relative 
robustness of our baseline estimates.
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g. Models with Heterogeneous or Asymmetric Peer Effects 
  Thus far all models have assumed that any peer interaction effects are constant across friend-
pairs, and symmetric.  In this section we consider models that relax these assumptions and allow the peer 
effects between a pair of friends to vary with characteristics of either the pair or the individual.  We begin 
with specifications that a variable Z to affect the peer effects by estimating models in which: 
(13a)   γ1  =  exp(a + bZ) , 
(13b)   γ2  =  exp(c + dZ) . 
For simplicity, we assume that the unobserved determinants of friends’ behavioral choices are 
uncorrelated, though in principle models that allow heterogeneous or asymmetric peer effects and 
correlated heterogeneity are estimable.  
  The results from these models are presented in Table 9.  The top panel shows the estimates for the 
parameters in (13a) and (13b), while the lower panel of the table shows the implied peer effects for 
different types of friend-pairs.  The first four columns allow the peer effects to depend on the gender of 
the friends (columns 1-2) and their average age (columns 3-4).  The estimates suggest that peer effects 
differ by gender but not by age.  The gender interaction terms, though not significant by conventional 
standards, suggest that peer effects are larger for females than for males and that there are especially large 
gender differences in peer effects for the initiation of sexual intercourse. 
  The remaining columns examine the role of friendship stability and reciprocity.  In columns 5-6, 
we allow the peer effect to depend on the predicted probability that the two friends nominate each other as 
best friends in the second wave of the survey.  We estimate this probability using a simple probit model 
                                                 
31 We conducted a third check in which we added information on the fraction of each individual’s classmates who 
had experienced intimate touching or intercourse as of Wage 1 to the choice models.  The results, available on 
request, show that the fraction of classmates with sexual experience has a positive but imprecisely estimated effect 
on the rate of initiation of sex by the best friend pairs with limited sexual experience at Wave 1. Moreover the 
addition of this variable has a negligible impact on the estimates of ρ, γ1 and γ2.    28
that includes both the means and absolute differences in the friends’ characteristics, a set of dummies 
indicating the source of the friendship nominations used to construct the match (Wave 1 in-home 
interview, in-school questionnaire, or both), and a dummy for whether the best friend nomination was 
reciprocated by both parties in Wave 1.  The heterogeneity estimates imply significantly stronger peer 
effects in friendships that are more likely to be reciprocated one year later.     
  Reciprocity of friendship nominations at Wave 1 is a strong predictor of whether the friendship 
will be reciprocated at Wave 2.  Hence, one explanation for the finding of smaller peer effects in the less 
stable friendship may be that the peer influence in unreciprocated friendships is unidirectional (or 
asymmetric).
32  The models in columns 7-8 allow the peer effects experienced by a student to depend on 
whether the student reciprocated the friendship nomination of the person we match as their friend.  The 
estimates imply large asymmetries; indeed students who we assign to a friendship but who did not 
reciprocate the nomination experience negligible peer effects.  This finding suggests that the average peer 
effects we measure in our overall sample (which includes reciprocating and non-reciprocating friend 
pairs) may understate the importance of peer effects between reciprocating best friends. 
  To further explore the differences across reciprocated and non-reciprocated friendships, we fit 
separate versions of our baseline model (from columns 4 and 8 of Table 5) for the two sets of friend-pairs 
in our sample.  As shown in columns 1-4 of Table 10, the estimated social interaction effects (γ1 and γ2) 
and the estimated correlation parameter ρ are all larger for reciprocated best-friend pairs, though the 
estimates are relatively imprecise.  In particular, the estimated peer effect for the initiation of intercourse 
implies that among reciprocated best friends, the likelihood of initiating intercourse increases by more 
than 6 percentage points if one’s best friend also does so, while among non-reciprocated pairs, the 
corresponding increase is only about 2.5 percentage points.   
  We also fit an asymmetric model for the non-reciprocated pairs, allowing different values of γ1 
and γ2 for the nominators (i.e., the person who named the other his/her best friend) and the non-
                                                 
32 Two recent papers that analyze Add Health data make the assumption that directionality of peer effects can be 
inferred from asymmetries in friendship nominations and use this assumption to help identify peer effects in spatial 
autoregressive model (Bramoulle, et al., 2009; Lin, 2010).   29
reciprocator (the person who failed to name the other his/her best friend).  The results, in columns 5 and 
6 of Table 10, suggest that the nominator experiences relatively strong social interaction effects (roughly 
a 3.5 percentage point change in the likelihood of initiating intercourse) whereas the non-reciprocator 
experiences relatively weak effects (roughly 1.5 percentage points). 
 
V. Estimation Results for Other Risky Behaviors 
  In this section we briefly summarize the estimation results for models of the interactions in other 
forms of risky behavior by best friend pairs.  We focus on bivariate ordered probit models estimated 
under a simple “equal probability” assumption for observed outcomes when there are multiple equilibria.  
Panels A, B, and C of Table 11 present results for cigarette smoking, marijuana use, and truancy, 
respectively. In each case, the estimation sample includes only friend pairs in which neither friend was 
engaging in the behavior (at either an intermediate or high level) as of Wave 1.  The layout of the each 
panel is similar to the format of Table 5, with parallel sets of models excluding and including indicators 
for other risky behaviors as of Wave 1. 
  The results for cigarette smoking are similar to the results for initiation of sex in several ways.  
First, the models with social interactions provide slightly larger likelihood values and improved goodness 
of fit compared to the models with only correlated heterogeneity.  Second, the specifications with social 
interactions imply stronger peer effects for the more intense level of activity (here, regular cigarette 
smoking).  And third, as in Table 5, the specifications that control for other risky behaviors in Wave 1 
produce estimates that are very similar to those from the baseline model.  However, the models for 
cigarette smoking that include both correlated heterogeneity and peer effects (columns 4 and 8) yield 
larger estimates of the correlation parameter than those found in the models of sexual activity, and the 
social interaction estimates in these specifications are not statistically significant. These results are less 
conclusive than the results for sex about the presence of peer effects, and suggest that some of the 
correlation patterns in cigarette smoking may be due to common unobserved heterogeneity.   30
  The estimated models of marijuana use are very different from the models for sex and tobacco.  
First, the models that include social interaction effects fit the data much better than the model with only 
correlated heterogeneity.  Second, the estimates for γ1 are much larger than those for γ2, suggesting that 
peer effects are larger for experimental use than for regular use.  And third, the models that include both 
correlated heterogeneity and peer effects produce negative estimates for the correlation parameter.  This 
last result is counterintuitive and makes the estimates from the combined model difficult to interpret.  One 
simple potential explanation is that marijuana use is less precisely measured in the Add Health survey 
than other risky behaviors, and as a result, our classification of individuals as experimental or regular 
marijuana users may be subject to a relatively large degree of measurement error.
33  For this reason, the 
ordered probit model may not provide the significant bias reduction over the probit model that we saw in 
our simulations and in the model for sexual activity.    
  Finally, the models for truancy behavior also differ somewhat from the models for sex and 
cigarette smoking.  Truancy is even more highly correlated within friend pairs than the other risky 
behaviors. (A simple chi-squared statistic for the 3×3 table of joint truancy behavior has the highest value 
of all 4 behaviors, 49.4).  And here, the models that allow both correlated heterogeneity and peer effects 
fit better than either model that allows just one of these factors.  Although the parameter estimates these 
flexible models and are relatively imprecise, the point estimates suggest that both factors may be present.  
Finally, the estimates of γ1 and γ2 suggest that the peer for skipping school once is slightly larger than the 
peer effect for more regular truancy behavior. 
 
VI. Summary and Conclusions 
  We have presented a simple approach to estimating social interaction effects in the risky behavior 
of adolescent best-friend pairs, based on econometric models of their joint outcomes that allow for 
                                                 
33 Our definition of “experimental” use is based on whether the respondent indicates having tried marijuana as of the 
Wave 2 interview, while our definition of “regular” use is based on whether the respondent indicates having used 
one or more times in past 30 days.  Thus, respondents who tried marijuana for the first time in the past 30 days may 
be misclassified as regular users, while more regular users may be classified as experimental users if they went for 
30 days without using.      31
correlated unobserved heterogeneity.  Methodologically, our approach is closely related to studies of 
market entry games, including Bresnahan and Reiss (1990) and Tamer (2005).   As in these studies, we 
rely on an exclusion restriction – specifically, a variable or set of variables that directly affects only one 
of the friends – to empirically distinguish between social interaction effects and correlated heterogeneity.  
The rich set of variables collected in the Add Health data set includes several variables that plausibly 
exert no direct effect on a friend’s choices, and our estimates of the social interaction effects in the 
initiation of sexual behavior are quite robust to alternative sources of identifying variation.   
  An important advantage of our approach is that it uses “naturally occurring” friendships of the 
kind that mediate many forms of adolescent behavior.  An alternative identification strategy employed in 
a number of recent studies relies on “randomly assigned” peer groups such as college roommates.  While 
much can be learned from such designs, it is unclear whether the social interaction effects observed from 
the behavior of individuals assigned to random peer groups adequately represent the peer effects 
experienced in naturally occurring friendships.  Indeed, Carrell et al. (2011) show that the reduced-form 
estimates from such studies can be difficult to interpret because they depend on the patterns of association 
that emerge after random assignment, depending on the structure of the constructed peer group.    
  Our empirical results suggest that adolescent friends’ decisions to become sexually active exhibit 
important but “modest-sized” interaction effects.  Having a best friend who is engaging in intercourse, for 
example, raises the likelihood that a previously inexperienced adolescent also engages in intercourse by 
4-5 percentage points (relative to a average rate of initiation of about 14 percent).  Similar effects are also 
present for other risky behaviors, including use of tobacco and marijuana and truancy (though not for the 
use of alcohol).  These effects are large enough to warrant parental concern but not so large as to 
overwhelm the influence of other individual and family characteristics. 
  We also find evidence of heterogeneity in the magnitude of these effects.  Our estimates suggest 
that peer influence is strongest between best friends in “reciprocated” friendships (e.g., the likelihood that 
one member of a reciprocated pair of best friend initiates intercourse when the other does rises by more 
than 6 percentage points).  In non-reciprocated pairs, the effects are asymmetric.  The person who named   32
the other as their best friend experiences relatively strong social interaction effects (roughly a 3.5 
percentage point change in the likelihood of initiating intercourse), whereas the non-reciprocator 
experiences relatively weak effects (roughly 1.5 percentage points).  This pattern suggests that the modest 
size of the peer effects observed in many studies that rely on random or quasi-random manipulation of 
“peer groups” may be due in part to smaller social interaction effects between people who are not as 
closely connected as best friends.  More generally, these results underscore the importance of peer group 
structure in determining the strength of peer effects.   33
References 
Akerlof, George A. 1997.  “Social Distance and Social Decisions.” Econometrica 65(5): 1005-1027. 
Altonji, Joseph, Todd Elder and Christopher Taber.  2005.  “Selection on Observed and Unobserved 
Variables: Assessing the Effectiveness of Catholic Schools.”  Journal of Political Economy 113(1): 
151-184. 
Argys, Laura M, and Daniel I. Rees. 2008. “Searching for Peers Effects: A Test of the Contagion 
Hypothesis.” The Review of Economics and Statistics 90(3): 442-458. 
Bajari, Patrick, Han Hong and Stephen P. Ryan. 2009. “Identification and Estimation of a Discrete Game 
of Complete Information.” Econometrica 78(5): 1529-68. 
Berndt, Thomas J. 1982. “The Features and Effects of Friendship in Early Adolescence.”  Child 
Development 53: 1447-1460.  
Bjorn, P. and Q. Vuong. 1984. “Simultaneous Equations Models for Dummy Endogenous Variables: A 
Game Theoretic Formulation with Application to Labor Force Participation.” Unpublished Working 
Paper SSWP No. 537, California Institute of Technology. 
Bramoulle, Yann, Habiba Djebbari and Bernard Fortin. 2009. “Identification of Peer Effects through 
Social Networks.” Journal of Econometrics. 150(1): 41-55. 
Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Peter C. Reiss. 1990.  “Entry in Monopoly Markets.”  Review of Economic 
Studies 57: 531-553. 
Bresnahan, Timothy F. and Peter C. Reiss.  1991.  “Empirical Models of Discrete Games.”  Journal of 
Econometrics 48: 57-81. 
Brock, William A. and Steven Durlauf.  2001.  “Discrete Choice with Social Interactions.”  Review of 
Economic Studies 68: 235-60. 
Carrell, Scott E., Richard L. Fullerton and James E. West.  2009. “Does Your Cohort Matter? Estimating 
Peer Effects in College Achievement.” Journal of Labor Economics 27(3): 439-464. 
Carrell, Scott E., Bruce I. Sacerdote and James E. West.  2011. “From Natural Variation to Optimal 
Policy? The Lucas Critique Meets Peer Effects.”  NBER Working Paper No. 16865, National Bureau 
of Economic Research, Inc. 
Ciliberto, Federico. and Elie Tamer.  2009. “Market Structure and Multiple Equilibria in Airline 
Markets.” Econometrica 77(6): 1791-1828. 
De Giorgi, Giacomo, Michele Pellizzari and Silvia Redaelli. 2010. “Identification of Social Interactions 
through Partially Overlapping Peer Groups.” American Economic Journal: Applied Economics, 2(2): 
241-275.   34
Fryer, Roland and Paul Torelli. 2006.  “An Empirical Analysis of Acting White.” Harvard University 
Department of Economics Unpublished Working Paper.  URL: 
http://www.economics.harvard.edu/faculty/fryer/files/fryer_torelli.pdf  
Harris, K.M., C.T. Halpern, E. Whitsel, J. Hussey, J. Tabor, P. Entzel, and J.R. Udry. 2009. The National 
Longitudinal Study of Adolescent Health: Research Design.  URL: 
http://www.cpc.unc.edu/projects/addhealth/design. 
Haynie, Dana L. 2001. “Delinquent Peers Revisited: Does Network Structure Matter?” American Journal 
of Sociology 104(4): 1013-1057. 
Halliday, Timothy J. and Sally Kwak. 2009. “Weight Gain in Adolescents and Their Peers.” Economics 
and Human Biology 7: 181-190. 
Heckman, James J.  1978.  “Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data Developed and Applied to Test the 
Hypothesis of True State Dependence against the Hypothesis of Spurious State Dependence.” 
Annales de l'inséé (30/31): 227-69. 
Heckman, James J. 1981. “Statistical Models for Discrete Panel Data.”  In Charles F. Manski and Daniel 
McFadden, editors, Structural Analysis of Discrete Data with Econometric Applications.  Cambridge, 
MIT Press, 1981: 114-175. 
Huang, Ching-I.  2010.  “Intra-Household Effects on Demand for Telephone Service: Empirical 
Evidence.”  Unpublished paper. 
Hyslop, Dean R. 1999. “State Dependence, Serial Correlation and Heterogeneity in Intertemporal Labor 
Force Participation of Married Women.”  Econometrica 67: 1255-1294. 
Jacob, Brian.  2004.  “Public Housing, Housing Vouchers and Student Achievement: Evidence from 
Public Housing Demolitions in Chicago.”  American Economic Review  94(1): 233-258. 
Kling, Jeffrey R., Jeffrey B. Liebman and Lawrence F. Katz. 2007. “Experimental Analysis of 
Neighborhood Effects.” Econometrica, 75(1), 83–119. 
Krauth, Brian V.  2006.  “Simulation-Based Estimation of Peer Effects.”  Journal of Econometrics 133: 
243-71.   
Krauth, Brian V.  2007.  “Peer and Selection Effects on Youth Smoking in California.”  Journal of 
Business and Economic Statistics 25(3): 288-98. 
Kremer, Michael and Dan Levy. 2008.  "Peer Effects and Alcohol Use Among College Students." 
Journal of Economic Perspectives 22(3): 189-206. 
Lin, Xu. 2010. “Identifying Peer Effects in Student Academic Achievement by Spatial Autoregressive 
Models with Group Unobservables.” Journal of Labor Economics. 28(4): 825-860. 
Manski, Charles F.  1993.  “The Identification of Endogenous Social Effects: The Reflection Problem.”  
Review of Economic Studies 60: 531-42.   35
Moffitt, Robert. (2001). “Policy Interventions, Low-level equilibria, and Social Interactions.”  In S. 
Durlauf  and P. Young (Eds.), Social Dynamics Cambridge, MA: MIT Press:  45–82. 
Oreopoulos, Philip. 2003. “The Long Run Consequences of Growing Up in a Poor Neighbourhood.” 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 118(4): 1533-1575. 
Sacerdote, Bruce I. (2001). Peer effects with random assignment: Results for Dartmouth roommates. 
Quarterly Journal of Economics 116(2), 681–704. 
Smith, Kirsten P. and Nicholas Christakis.  2008.  “Social Networks and Health.”  Annual Review of 
Sociology 34: 405-429. 
Soetevent, Adriaan R. and Peter Kooreman.  2006.  “A Discrete Choice Model with Social Interactions: 
An Analysis of High School Teen Behavior.” Journal of Applied Econometrics 22: 599-624. 
Stinebrickner, Ralph and Todd R. Stinebrickner. 2006. “What Can be Learned About Peer Effects Using 
College Roommates? Evidence from New Survey Data and Students from Disadvantaged 
Backgrounds. Journal of Public Economics 90(8-9): 1435-1454. 
Tamer, Elie.  2003.  “Incomplete Simultaneous Discrete Response Model with Multiple Equilibria.”  
Review of Economic Studies 70: 147-165. 
Zimmerman, David. 2003. “Peer Effects in Academic Outcomes: Evidence from a Natural Experiment.”  
Review of Economics and Statistics 85(1), 9–23. Figure 1: Partition of (ε1, ε2) for Bivariate Probit 
Model



















c10‐X1β‐γ1 c10‐X1β → c20‐X1β c20‐X1β‐γ2













(1) (2) (3) (4)
Individual & Family Characteristics 
Age (in years, as of wave 1) 15.80 15.79 15.14 15.28
Male  0.49 0.45 0.43 0.42
Black race 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.14
Other non‐white race  0.15 0.17 0.17 0.16
GPA (1‐4 scale) 2.73 2.81 3.01 2.99
Physical development index  0.13 0.16 ‐0.04 0.04
Attitude toward risk (1‐5 scale) 3.54 3.55 3.47 3.50
Future orientation (1‐5 scale) 3.58 3.60 3.65 3.64
Time preference (1‐5 scale) 1.58 1.58 1.53 1.53
Smokers in household (yes/no) 0.42 0.40 0.33 0.35
Two‐parent household (yes no)  0.68 0.71 0.77 0.77
Freq. parents attend church (0‐3 scale) 1.76 1.82 1.89 1.85
Parents not religious (yes/no) 0.19 0.17 0.15 0.16
Parental church attendance missing 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
At least 1 parent finished high school 0.88 0.88 0.90 0.90
At least 1 parent finished college 0.37 0.38 0.43 0.43
Parental education missing 0.05 0.04 0.03 0.03
Risky Behaviors as of Wave 1:
Intimate touching 0.43 0.40 0.00 0.12
Had intercourse  0.35 0.31 0.00 0.00
Tried cigarette smoking  0.41 0.39 0.24 0.28
Smoked cigarettes regularly 0.18 0.15 0.05 0.07
Tried marijuana 0.26 0.25 0.09 0.12
Used marijuana regularly 0.14 0.13 0.04 0.06
Drank alcohol without adult presence 0.38 0.38 0.21 0.26
Drank alcohol regularly 0.16 0.15 0.05 0.07
Skipped school 1 or more days 0.27 0.26 0.13 0.14
Skipped school 2 or more days 0.20 0.18 0.08 0.09
Sex Experiences as of Wave 2:
Intimate touching w/ opposite sex 0.531 0.517 0.222 0.301
Had intercourse 0.450 0.429 0.138 0.182













Age (in years, as of wave 1) 0.85 0.88 0.88
Black race 0.86 0.84 0.85
GPA (1‐4) 0.34 0.40 0.37
Physical development index 0.27 0.27 0.29
Attitude toward risk (1‐5 scale) 0.09 0.08 0.09
Future orientation (1‐5 scale) 0.14 0.15 0.16
Time preference (1‐5 scale) 0.04 0.05 0.06
Smokers in household (yes/no) 0.17 0.17 0.18
Two‐parent household (yes/no) 0.16 0.15 0.15
Freq. parents attend church (0‐3 scale) 0.28 0.32 0.30
At least 1 parent finished high school 0.34 0.38 0.34
At least 1 parent finished college 0.31 0.27 0.30
Risky Behaviors as of Wave 1
Intimate touching  0.33 ‐‐ 0.13
Had intercourse  0.36 ‐‐ ‐‐
Tried cigarette smoking  0.29 0.25 0.26
Smoked cigarettes regularly  0.34 0.13 0.17
Tried marijuana  0.41 0.37 0.37
Used marijuana regularly 0.25 0.18 0.22
Drank alcohol without adult presence 0.29 0.26 0.29
Drank alcohol regularly  0.21 0.14 0.16
Skipped school 1 or more days 0.28 0.23 0.22







  a. Median/Mean Error in γ 0.01 / 0.00 ‐‐ ‐0.07 / 0.04
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.27)
  b. Median/Mean Error in ρ  ‐‐ 0.25 / 0.25 .07 / ‐0.02
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.26)
2.  DGP #2: γ=0, ρ=0.21
  a. Median/Mean Error in γ 0.17 / 0.18 ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.12
          (std. dev) (0.07) (0.19)
  b. Median/Mean Error in ρ  ‐‐ ‐0.01 / 0.00 ‐0.06 / ‐0.12
          (std. dev) (0.07) (0.19)
3.  DGP #3: γ=0.125, ρ=0.11
  a. Median/Mean Error in γ 0.09 / 0.10 ‐‐ ‐0.13 / 0.01
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.23)










  a. Median/Mean Error in γ1  0.00 / 0.00 ‐‐ ‐0.02 / ‐0.02
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.10)
  b. Median/Mean Error in γ2  ‐0.01 / ‐0.01 ‐‐ ‐0.02 / ‐0.02
          (std. dev) (0.07) (0.10)
  c. Median/Mean Error in ρ  ‐‐ 0.21 / 0.21 0.01 / 0.02
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.10)
2.  DGP #2: γ1=0, γ2=0, ρ=0.25
  a. Median/Mean Error in γ1  0.17 / 0.16 ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.02
          (std. dev) (0.08) (0.04)
  b. Median/Mean Error in γ2  0.16 / 0.15 ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.03
          (std. dev) (0.09) (0.04)
  c. Median/Mean Error in ρ  ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.00 0.02 / ‐0.02
          (std. dev) (0.06) (0.07)
3.  DGP #3: γ1=0.10 γ2=0.15, ρ=0.15
  a. Median/Mean Error in γ1  0.10 / 0.11 ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.00
          (std. dev) (0.07) (0.06)
  b. Median/Mean Error in γ2  0.10 / 0.10 ‐‐ 0.00 / 0.00
          (std. dev) (0.07) (0.09)





(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Wave 1 Behaviors? no no no no yes yes yes yes
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.19 ‐‐ ‐0.67 ‐‐ 0.13 ‐‐ ‐0.21
(0.06) (1.47) (0.08) (0.25)
Social Interaction Effect (γ)  ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.20 0.92 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.14 0.33
(friend has had intercourse) (0.05) (1.80) (0.06) (0.23)
Log Likelihood ‐798.51 ‐794.84 ‐793.55 ‐791.94 ‐733.88 ‐732.47 ‐731.88 ‐731.54
Goodness of Fit (4 cells) 12.69 1.89 1.20 1.07 4.47 0.57 0.12 0.09







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Wave 1 Behaviors? no no no no yes yes yes yes
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.28 ‐‐ ‐0.91 ‐‐ 0.22 ‐‐ ‐0.28
(0.08) (0.14) (0.09) (0.54)
Social Interaction Effect (γ) ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.28 1.29 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.22 0.49
(friend has had intercourse) (0.07) (0.17) (0.07) (0.57)
Log Likelihood ‐537.04 ‐532.33 ‐531.52 ‐530.47 ‐494.56 ‐492.13 ‐491.54 ‐491.29
Goodness of Fit (4 cells) 13.32 0.69 0.40 0.58 6.44 0.38 0.03 0.02







(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Wave 1 Behaviors? no no no no yes yes yes yes
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.24 ‐‐ 0.08 ‐‐ 0.18 ‐‐ 0.02
(0.06) (0.10) (0.07) (0.10)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ Intermediate ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.20 0.14 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.16 0.15
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.05) (0.08) (0.06) (0.08)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ High Level ‐ ‐‐ ‐ 0.27 0.21 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.23 0.21
 of Activity (γ2) (0.06) (0.09) (0.06) (0.09)
Log Likelihood ‐944.86 ‐938.57 ‐936.50 ‐936.27 ‐894.06 ‐890.85 ‐888.65 ‐888.63






















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Social Interaction Effect on Intermediate 0.20 0.20 0.21 0.09 0.09
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.05) (0.05) (0.06) (0.07) (0.08)
Social Interaction Effect on High Level  0.27 0.27 0.27 0.00 0.00
  of Activity (γ2) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (‐‐)
a (‐‐)
a
Log Likelihood ‐936.50 ‐936.26 ‐936.78 ‐786.94 ‐909.49
Goodness of Fit  1.64 1.69 1.68 0.43 ‐‐
























alcohol use as of Wave 1.  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Include Wave 1 Behaviors? no yes no yes no yes no yes
Effect of Excluded Variable         ‐‐        ‐‐ 0.26 0.26 ‐0.14 ‐0.06 0.11 0.07
   on Individual Behavior (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04)
Error correlation (ρ) 0.08 0.02 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.07 0.10 0.05
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Social Interaction‐ Interm. 0.14 0.15 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.11 0.13 0.12
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09)
Social Interaction ‐ High 0.21 0.21 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.17 0.20 0.19
   Level of Activity (γ2) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.10) (0.10)
Log Likelihood ‐936.27 ‐888.63 ‐921.72 ‐874.33 ‐922.16 ‐875.46 ‐925.28 ‐875.62










(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Equation for γ1:
Constant (a) ‐1.25 ‐1.43 1.57 ‐7.20 ‐2.26 ‐2.69 ‐1.42 ‐1.84
(0.25) (0.31) (7.79) (12.16) (0.27) (0.37) (0.26) (0.40)
Coefficient on variable (b) ‐1.01 ‐1.14 ‐0.21 0.34 3.32 4.13 ‐0.74 ‐16.00
(0.84) (1.14) (0.53) (0.72) (0.69) (0.81) (0.08) (.)
Equation for γ2:
Constant (c) ‐0.91 ‐1.03 3.69 ‐0.48 ‐2.11 ‐2.95 ‐1.17 ‐1.46
(0.21) (0.26) (4.84) (5.05) (0.30) (0.54) (0.20) (0.27)
Coefficient on variable (d) ‐1.29 ‐1.56 ‐0.33 ‐0.07 3.38 4.94 ‐0.58 ‐0.85
(0.76) (1.09) (0.33) (0.32) (0.82) (1.21) (0.44) (0.79)
Expanded Set of Controls for Wave 1 No Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes
   Behaviors
Log Likelihood ‐933.47 ‐885.80 ‐933.74 ‐885.94 ‐932.40 ‐885.09 ‐935.52 ‐889.13
Implied Peer Effects for Representative Groups:
                                                         γ1 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.08 0.34 0.29 0.24 0.16
                                                         γ2 0.40 0.36 0.39 0.23 0.39 0.30 0.31 0.23
                                                         γ1 0.10 0.08 0.14 0.23 0.15 0.10 0.12 0.00




















(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Include Wave 1 Behaviors? no yes no yes no yes
Error correlation (ρ) 0.20 0.27 0.07 0.02 0.06 0.02
(0.25) (0.28) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ Intermediate 0.23 0.18 0.06 0.06
  Level of Activity (γ1) (Avg) (0.20) (0.21) (0.09) (0.09)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ High Level  0.33 0.26 0.10 0.11









Log Likelihood ‐313.09 ‐289.61 ‐609.17 ‐572.9 ‐608.74 ‐572.75












(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
A.  Cigarette Smoking
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.23 ‐‐ 0.11 ‐‐ 0.21 ‐‐ 0.10
(0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ Intermediate ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.20 0.10 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.18 0.10
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.14)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ High Level ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.45 0.34 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.44 0.35
  of Activity (γ2) (0.20) (0.22) (0.20) (0.22)
Log Likelihood ‐807.42 ‐802.25 ‐801.29 ‐800.99 ‐782.28 ‐777.99 ‐776.99 ‐776.72
Goodness of Fit (9 cells) 19.68 6.72 5.66 5.02 16.99 6.90 5.57 5.13
B.  Marijuana 
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.19 ‐‐ ‐0.20 ‐‐ 0.17 ‐‐ ‐0.19
(0.07) (0.07) (0.08) (0.12)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ Intermediate ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.31 0.48 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.30 0.45
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.08) (0.08) (0.09) (0.16)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ High Level ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.11 0.25 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.08 0.21
  of Activity (γ2) (0.18) (0.04) (0.13) (0.20)
Log Likelihood ‐767.43 ‐765.10 ‐758.01 ‐757.02 ‐712.86 ‐711.25 704.79 ‐703.96
Goodness of Fit (9 cells) 36.88 24.17 2.97 1.89 32.45 24.17 3.76 1.93
C.  Truancy
Error correlation (ρ) ‐‐ 0.32 ‐‐ 0.16 ‐‐ 0.33 ‐‐ 0.17
(0.06) (0.14) (0.07) (0.15)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ Intermediate ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.30 0.18 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.30 0.17
  Level of Activity (γ1) (0.07) (0.14) (0.07) (0.14)
Social Interaction Effect ‐ High Level ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.27 0.15 ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.26 0.14
  of Activity (γ2) (0.10) (0.14) (0.10) (0.14)
Log Likelihood ‐968.40 ‐957.22 ‐956.16 ‐955.34 ‐952.10 ‐941.31 ‐940.43 ‐939.57















Age (in years, as of wave 1) 15.51 15.50 15.39
Male  0.43 0.43 0.43
Black race 0.27 0.20 0.19
Other non‐white race  0.18 0.16 0.13
GPA (1‐4 scale) 3.00 2.97 2.99
Physical development index  0.03 0.07 0.08
Attitude toward risk (1‐5 scale) 3.43 3.43 3.48
Future orientation (1‐5 scale) 3.72 3.69 3.70
Time preference (1‐5 scale) 1.50 1.53 1.52
Smokers in household (yes/no) 0.33 0.36 0.36
Two‐parent household (yes/no)  0.73 0.74 0.75
Freq. parents attend church (0‐3 scale) 1.97 1.92 1.88
Parents not religious (yes/no) 0.14 0.15 0.16
Parental church attendance missing 0.12 0.12 0.10
At least 1 parent finished high school 0.89 0.89 0.91
At least 1 parent finished college 0.43 0.41 0.43
Parental education missing 0.04 0.04 0.03
Risky Behaviors as of Wave 1:
Intimate touching 0.25 0.27 0.28
Had intercourse  0.18 0.19 0.18
Tried cigarette smoking  0.00 0.25 0.30
Smoked cigarettes regularly 0.00 0.06 0.09
Tried marijuana 0.07 0.00 0.14
Used marijuana regularly 0.04 0.00 0.07
Drank alcohol without adult presence 0.16 0.24 0.29
Drank alcohol regularly 0.03 0.06 0.09
Skipped school 1 or more days 0.15 0.16 0.00








Number of observations 1,476 2,152 1,928
Notes: see text and notes to Table 1.Appendix Table 2a: Estimated Bivariate Probit Models for Sexual Intercourse by Friend Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.08 0.09 0.09 0.08 0.08
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Male ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00
(0.10) (0.10) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Black race 0.31 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.47 0.46 0.46 0.45
(0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.18) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
GPA ‐0.17 ‐0.17 ‐0.16 ‐0.12 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 ‐0.06 ‐0.05
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.15) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Physcial development index 0.23 0.22 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.14) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Attitude toward risk 0.15 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Future orientation ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.05 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.04 ‐0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.07) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time preference 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.04 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01 ‐0.01
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.11) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Smokers in household 0.23 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.19 0.18 0.18 0.18
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Two‐parent household ‐0.23 ‐0.22 ‐0.22 ‐0.21 ‐0.22 ‐0.21 ‐0.21 ‐0.21
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.13) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.09)
Freq. parents attend church ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.04)
Parents not religious ‐0.16 ‐0.16 ‐0.16 ‐0.16 ‐0.26 ‐0.26 ‐0.25 ‐0.25
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.10) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.12)
At least 1 parent finished high school ‐0.22 ‐0.22 ‐0.22 ‐0.17 ‐0.24 ‐0.24 ‐0.23 ‐0.22
(0.11) (0.12) (0.11) (0.20) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12)
At least 1 parent finished college ‐0.14 ‐0.14 ‐0.14 ‐0.13 ‐0.17 ‐0.17 ‐0.17 ‐0.17
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Tried cigarette smoking as of W1 0.14 0.15 0.14 0.13
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11)
Smoked cigarettes regularly as of W1 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Tried marijuana as of W1 0.21 0.22 0.21 0.18
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.15)
Used marijuana regularly as of W1 0.05 0.03 0.04 0.06
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.16)
Drank alcohol without adult presence  0.47 0.47 0.47 0.46
   as of W1 (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Drank alcohol regularly as of W1 0.45 0.43 0.43 0.44
(0.15) (0.15) (0.15) (0.15)
Skipped school 1 or more days as of W1 0.29 0.29 0.28 0.27
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13)
Skipped school 2 or more days as of W1 ‐0.10 ‐0.10 ‐0.10 ‐0.09
(0.14) (0.13) (0.13) (0.14)
Note: see notes to Table 4a.
Baseline  Expanded Set of Covariates Appendix Table 2b: Estimated Bivariate Probit Models for Sexual Intercourse by Friend Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 0.09 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03)
Male 0.05 0.06 0.05 0.03 0.09 0.10 0.10 0.09
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.11) (0.10) (0.09)
Black race 0.34 0.31 0.30 0.23 0.48 0.46 0.45 0.44
(0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.08) (0.16) (0.16) (0.15) (0.15)
GPA ‐0.19 ‐0.20 ‐0.19 ‐0.10 ‐0.10 ‐0.12 ‐0.11 ‐0.09
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.08)
Physcial development index 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.17 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.21
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Attitude toward risk 0.12 0.11 0.12 0.11 0.07 0.07 0.07 0.07
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Future orientation ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.04
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.03) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Time preference 0.11 0.12 0.12 0.06 0.07 0.08 0.08 0.06
(0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.07) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Smokers in household 0.29 0.27 0.28 0.26 0.23 0.22 0.22 0.22
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.08) (0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Two‐parent household ‐0.22 ‐0.20 ‐0.21 ‐0.20 ‐0.24 ‐0.22 ‐0.23 ‐0.23
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.09) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
Freq. parents attend church ‐0.05 ‐0.03 ‐0.04 ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05
(0.07) (0.06) (0.06) (0.05) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Parents not religious ‐0.17 ‐0.11 ‐0.14 ‐0.21 ‐0.28 ‐0.25 ‐0.26 ‐0.27
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.18) (0.21) (0.20) (0.20) (0.21)
At least 1 parent finished high school ‐0.22 ‐0.23 ‐0.22 ‐0.13 ‐0.26 ‐0.27 ‐0.26 ‐0.24
(0.13) (0.14) (0.14) (0.09) (0.14) (0.15) (0.15) (0.14)
At least 1 parent finished college ‐0.08 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 ‐0.10 ‐0.10 ‐0.09 ‐0.09 ‐0.10
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.08) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Tried cigarette smoking as of W1 0.14 0.14 0.13 0.12
(0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Smoked cigarettes regularly as of W1 0.36 0.35 0.36 0.36
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Tried marijuana as of W1 0.15 0.16 0.14 0.11
(0.20) (0.19) (0.19) (0.20)
Used marijuana regularly as of W1 0.03 0.01 0.02 0.04
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.22)
Drank alcohol without adult presence 0.52 0.52 0.52 0.51
  as of W1 (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Drank alcohol regularly as of W1 0.21 0.18 0.19 0.19
(0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
Skipped school 1 or more days as of W1 0.45 0.47 0.46 0.43
(0.16) (0.15) (0.15) (0.18)
Skipped school 2 or more days as of W1 ‐0.16 ‐0.17 ‐0.18 ‐0.17
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Note: see notes to Table 4b.
Baseline  Expanded Set of Covariates Appendix Table 3: Estimated Bivariate Ordered Probit Models for Sexual Activity by Friend Pairs
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Age 0.06 0.06 0.05 0.05 0.03 0.03 0.02 0.02
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
Male 0.01 0.02 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.04 0.04 0.04
(0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09) (0.09)
Black race 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.34 0.33 0.32 0.32
(0.13) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.14) (0.14) (0.13) (0.14)
GPA ‐0.16 ‐0.16 ‐0.15 ‐0.16 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Physcial development index 0.24 0.25 0.24 0.24 0.23 0.24 0.24 0.24
(0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05)
Attitude toward risk 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.07 0.06 0.07 0.07
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Future orientation ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02 ‐0.02
(0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Time preference 0.09 0.09 0.10 0.09 0.04 0.04 0.05 0.05
(0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07) (0.07)
Smokers in household 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.16 0.16 0.16
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Two‐parent household ‐0.18 ‐0.18 ‐0.18 ‐0.18 ‐0.20 ‐0.20 ‐0.20 ‐0.20
(0.11) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11) (0.11)
Freq. parents attend church ‐0.06 ‐0.04 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.06 ‐0.05 ‐0.05 ‐0.05
(0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06) (0.06)
Parents not religious ‐0.17 ‐0.11 ‐0.14 ‐0.13 ‐0.26 ‐0.22 ‐0.23 ‐0.23
(0.23) (0.22) (0.22) (0.22) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20) (0.20)
At least 1 parent finished high school ‐0.23 ‐0.23 ‐0.23 ‐0.23 ‐0.26 ‐0.27 ‐0.26 ‐0.26
(0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.13) (0.13)
At least 1 parent finished college ‐0.08 ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08 ‐0.08
(0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08) (0.08)
Tried cigarette smoking as of W1 0.21 0.20 0.20 0.20
(0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Smoked cigarettes regularly as of W1 0.32 0.31 0.32 0.32
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Tried marijuana as of W1 0.12 0.12 0.11 0.11
(0.17) (0.17) (0.17) (0.17)
Used marijuana regularly as of W1 0.10 0.09 0.10 0.09
(0.21) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Drank alcohol without adult presence 0.47 0.48 0.47 0.47
  as of W1 (0.10) (0.10) (0.10) (0.10)
Drank alcohol regularly as of W1 0.17 0.15 0.15 0.15
(0.18) (0.18) (0.18) (0.18)
Skipped school 1 or more days as of W1 0.37 0.37 0.36 0.36
(0.14) (0.14) (0.14) (0.14)
Skipped school 2 or more days as of W1 ‐0.06 ‐0.07 ‐0.07 ‐0.07




Direct Effect Cross Effect  ρ  γ1  γ2 Log Likelihod (9 d.f.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Baseline Model (Table 5, column 8) ‐‐ ‐‐ 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.63 0.47
(0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Covariate Allowed to Have Cross‐Effect on Friend:
1. Age 0.05 ‐0.03 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.52 0.50
(0.07) (0.07) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
2. Black 0.09 0.28 0.03 0.14 0.21 ‐887.51 0.41
(0.18) (0.15) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
3. GPA ‐0.10 0.08 0.01 0.16 0.23 ‐887.5 0.65
(0.06) (0.05) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
4. Physical Development Index 0.25 ‐0.06 0.01 0.16 0.22 ‐888.09 0.62
(0.05) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
5. Attitude to Risk 0.07 0.06 0.04 0.13 0.19 ‐887.14 0.38
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
6. Attitude to Future ‐0.02 0.04 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.11 0.52
(0.04) (0.04) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
7. Time Preference 0.05 ‐0.04 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.46 0.49
(0.07) (0.06) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
8. Two‐parent Household ‐0.20 ‐0.03 0.03 0.14 0.21 ‐888.58 0.44
(0.11) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
9. Any Smokers in Household 0.16 0.03 0.03 0.14 0.21 ‐888.56 0.43
(0.08) (0.08) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
10. Parental Church Attendence (Freq.) ‐0.07 0.05 0.02 0.15 0.22 ‐887.52 0.48
(0.06) (0.03) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
11. Dummy if Parents Non‐religious ‐0.23 ‐0.28 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐884.3 0.44
(0.19) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
12. At Least One Parent High School Grad ‐0.26 ‐0.01 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.63 0.46
(0.14) (0.11) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
13. At least One Parent College Grad. ‐0.06 ‐0.10 0.03 0.14 0.20 ‐887.94 0.40




Direct Effect Cross Effect  ρ  γ1  γ2 Log Likelihod (9 d.f.)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7)
Covariate Allowed to Have Cross‐Effect on Friend:
14. Tried Smoking Tobacco 0.19 0.08 0.04 0.13 0.20 ‐888.28 0.36
(0.10) (0.07) (0.11) (0.08) (0.09)
15. Regular Tobacco Smoker 0.32 0.18 0.04 0.13 0.19 ‐887.99 0.34
(0.18) (0.15) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
16. Tried Marijuana 0.09 0.10 0.04 0.13 0.19 ‐888.35 0.36
(0.17) (0.12) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
17. Regular Marijuana User 0.10 0.16 0.04 0.13 0.20 ‐888.22 0.37
(0.21) (0.17) (0.11) (0.09) (0.09)
18. Skipped 1 Day Last Year 0.36 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.63 0.46
(0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.08) (94.00)
19. Skipped 2 or More Days Last Year ‐0.07 0.08 0.03 0.14 0.20 ‐888.48 0.40
(0.20) (0.14) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
20. Tried Alcohol 0.47 0.00 0.02 0.15 0.21 ‐888.63 0.46
(0.10) (0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.10)
21. Regular Alcohol User 0.15 0.23 0.04 0.12 0.19 ‐887.61 0.33
(0.18) (0.12) (0.10) (0.08) (0.09)
Notes:  Standard errors in parentheses.  Specifications are the same as in column 8 of Table 5, except that each individual covariate indicated in the row heading is also 
allowed to have a direct effect on the individual's friend.   Entry in column 1 is the effect of the indicated covariate for a given individual on his/her own behavior.  
Entry in column 2 is the effect of the covariate for a given individual on his/her best friend.  (Cross effects from #1 to #2 and from #2 to #1 are restricted to be equal.)  
   Effects of Covariate: Heterogeneity/Social Interaction Parameters: